Just what the FUCK where they thinking?

>required it to sail practically within visual range of an enemy's coast
Not really. The Advance Gun System was designed to have a maximum firing range of 150 kilometers. The prototype shell built by Lockheed-Martin had a range of 109 kilometers, but it wasn't intended to be the final production version. You'd need to be at least 1760 meters above sea level the top of a Zumwalt-class destroyer. Any lower than that and it would be below the horizon.

they were the ones manning the tertiary guns, also might be doing damage control.

>disabled the safety measures on the magazines

Not really Beatty's fault. It was RN doctrine, dating back to the 1700's, to fire quicker than the enemy through better gun drill and "short cuts". Served them well in the age of sail, but with modern explosive rounds not a good idea to expose powder rooms.

You know one of the benefits of modern propellant was that they were less prone to blowing up spontaneously.

The Royal navy wasn't a bunch of suicidal idiots. Short cuts in shell handling has never been part of any navies doctrine. If they were part of doctrine they wouldn't have built the ships with said safety features in them.

One of the reasons they did the things was that they were under the impression that cordite would be safe as they thought it wouldn't produce explosive microparticles that is a big issue with earlier propellants. This turned out to be false as cordite as it degrades produce nitroglycerin crystals.

So no you can't excuse the explosive performance of the BCs on some fantasy doctrine. It was negligence, complacency and incompetence by the ones responsible.

You can't excuse Beatty on this one

>It was a doctrine, from the time of Collingwood, Nelson and Hood, to fire as quickly as possible
It was a doctrine from the time of the invention of warfare to fire as quickly as possible

This is very much not the same as
>magazine doors being left open for quicker fire rate

You claimed that the RN took shortcuts for two centuries leading to Jutland, and held up emphasis on rate of fire dating back to the Age of Sail as "proof".

This is incredibly stupid, because you're equating emphasis on rate of fire with leaving magazine doors open. It is as stupid as claiming that obese people overeat because humans have always sought food for consumption. It is as stupid as claiming that we equip our armies with miniguns today, a most decided emphasis on rate of fire, and thus like to leave our magazine doors open and vulnerable.

Did the crews on those ships at Jutland leave the magazine doors open? Yes, possibly. Is this endemic RN practice? No, it wasn't, not amongst other ships at Jutland, not by Nelson, not by Collingwood, not in 1700, and you are an utter moron for trying to link concepts a hundred years apart on such a tenuous and absurdly oversimplified link as "rate of fire".

>nor do you provide any backup for your ingnorant opinions
ironic
go on, tell me more about how Collingwood liked to leave his magazine doors open, dipshit

So did Collingwood take any shortcuts, Black person?

>something the age of sail commanders did not have to worry about
so the RN took zero precautions relating to magazines eh?

>follow a train of thought
there's no following this wreck; it was a mong's ignorant screeching before it ever left the station

>Straw manning
>says moron claiming Collingwood took shortcuts obsessing with rate of fire leading to Jutland

oh wait so it's OTHERS who took shortcuts now, not Collingwood? which others?
you said
>It was RN doctrine, dating back to the 1700's, to fire quicker than the enemy through better gun drill and "short cuts"
so I'm sure you have more than 200 years' worth of doctrinal "short cuts" to regale us with

go on, show us your "learning"

>the point is the obession with rate of fire
you claimed that this "obsession" lasted 200 years dating back to Collingwood and specifically through better gun drill AND "short cuts"; substantiate that claim - point out the "short cuts" - or suck your own dick you ignorant mong

>You said it was all beatty's fault which is nonsense
I wasn't that anon, but here's the point: you tried to link Beatty to a 100-plus year trend. For that to be valid, you certainly need more than just one example of "short cuts" occurring in one specific time period. You need to show that at least 100 years ago, "short cuts" were taken by the Navy to tacitly validate Beatty's recklessness.

The Royal Navy prioritised rate of fire, to great effect on its enemies. Any sensible military would prioritise rate of fire - have you ever seen any military say "take your time, no rush"? No. However, you labelled it an "obsession". For it to be an "obsession", it would have to be taken to dangerous extremes, to whit, "short cuts". Was it? Can you substantiate that? No, you could not, but you did include the clause to strengthen your specious bullshit with the implication. When called out, you could only point to Collingwood's rate of fire, which could well have stemmed simply from operational excellence, without being able to give any examples of the "short cuts" that you implied.

Absent this history of "short cuts", you're left trying to exonerate Beatty on the strength of "well it's not his fault, Collingwood said to shoot faster so he shot faster, the Navy encouraged him to take dangerous 'short cuts' despite nobody else in history ever taking such 'short cuts'." Which is a child's pitiful attempt at blame-shifting.

Is that what you do? Frick up at work and blame the institution's long history of encouraging this or that to excuse your moronation?

>I already said the short cuts were later
After being called out multiple times, yes you admitted to your sneaking little weasel words

>explain why it happened
Beatty and his mates cheated and were caught out

>It was institutional
Not to the extent of your risible claim

>The shelled handling and magazine saftey was only learnt after Jutland
Oh so the magazine doors were there for shits and giggles? "Proper procedure" was to leave them open?

>The admirality did not even consider this until after Jutland
So they only designed those magazine doors after Jutland?

Other British ships took heavier fire at Jutland. Did they leave their magazine doors open as well? Was this per Admiralty standard procedure?

>completely irrelevant
Of course
It sure took you a long while to admit it though

>Beatty, his subordinates, and his crew whole-heartedly embraced this doctrine. Lambert concludes that this led them to forego the proper storage of cordite
Yes, and violating Admiralty procedure which other crews followed

>None of the other battle cruisers took the turret penatrating hits
HMS Lion, shit for brains
Except her crew understood what magazine doors are for

Beatty and a few other ships abandoned Admiralty practice. Other ships didn't. Seethe, cope and dilate.

>the magazine doors had been closed
Interesting 😉

You are so fricking wrong you dumb idiot. The doors were only closed after the hit. Shit for brains you can't even read, you probably went on wikipedia and couldn't even understand the words!

"HMS Lion was hit by a 12 inch (305 mm) salvo from the German battlecruiser Lützow which blew the roof off the "Q" turret. Dozens of Royal Marines were killed, but a far worse catastrophe was averted when Major Francis Harvey, the mortally wounded turret commander, both of whose legs had been severed, with his last breath ordered the magazine doors to be closed. The magazine flooded, thereby preventing the cordite propellant from setting off a massive explosion. How close the ship came to destruction was later discovered when several of the gunnery crew had been found dead, with their hands still clutching the magazine door handles."

You're the one who doesn't seem to understand the purpose of magazine doors. Maybe try and read up on the subject?

Try familiarising yourself with the reload cycles according to Admiralty procedures, before commenting on that which you wot not.

https://i.imgur.com/XJxTyOX.jpg

>Beatty followed this but the in the modern era it created risks with magazine explosions, something the age of sail commanders did not have to worry about
Akshually, akhsually during age of sail there ware much of their own precautions. Working in magazine itself. It was lined with copper (no sparks, and against rats and water). Lamp was outside and it lit insides of teh magazine through window. There was dedicated lamp man whose job was to observe non stop that lamp works properly. No iron inside rule. People were working barefoot there or in shoes made from ropes.
And powder storage and distribution. Powder was not stored near guns. Only in the magazine. Each shot was delivered individually right before loading. Crew members called "powder monkeys" (usually boys because boy is enough) carried single shot and only single shot in the leather bag to the cannon. Canon fired. Next shot was delivered. So there were no piles of powder storage outside magazine and magazine itself was below waterline for protection.

The twat doesn't even know about fearnaught screens and hanging magazines. Collingwood my sainted aunt.

Yup
You conveniently neglected to mention that the blown up ships were the fastest in fleet gunnery exercises. Almost as if they were doing shit they shouldn't have, like leaving magazine doors open, when other ships like HMS Lion didn't.

You are so fricking wrong you dumb idiot. The doors were only closed after the hit. Shit for brains you can't even read, you probably went on wikipedia and couldn't even understand the words!

"HMS Lion was hit by a 12 inch (305 mm) salvo from the German battlecruiser Lützow which blew the roof off the "Q" turret. Dozens of Royal Marines were killed, but a far worse catastrophe was averted when Major Francis Harvey, the mortally wounded turret commander, both of whose legs had been severed, with his last breath ordered the magazine doors to be closed. The magazine flooded, thereby preventing the cordite propellant from setting off a massive explosion. How close the ship came to destruction was later discovered when several of the gunnery crew had been found dead, with their hands still clutching the magazine door handles."

Not being able to read and understand words seems to be a common theme with you - Serioiusly have you been tested for autism? Are you gonna frick off now after this embarrassment?

in fact in that he explicity mentions a live firing exercise in 1914 where the admirality wanted rate of fire even at the expense of accuracy with the idea being to close rapidly with the enemy to get into a better firing position. They believed that longer range engagements would be ineffective due to fog of war and communications and should take place below 10km. Another book which goes into more depth on this is Castles of Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of the Great War at Sea which has several chapters on the aftermath of Jutland.

See what I mean you are an ignorant fool- you haven't read anything about the reports and assessments after Jutland, especially those in Castles of Steel. The admirality did not even consider this until after Jutland, and the germans only did it after the losses in the battle of the falklands.

Nope
Just calling out the stupidity of your claims again 😉

"Unfortunately, the British had systematically undermined these protections in the search for rate of fire and ammunition capacity, and their magazine practices during the battle can only be described as suicidal. "

"In the immediate aftermath of the battle, magazine regulations were introduced, and flashtight doors were reinstalled. Both Beatty and Jellicoe, who had at least tacitly condoned the practices, quickly began searching for alternative explanations"

Jellicoe did it, and suported the idea, as well you frickwit. Institutional.

>modern era it created risks with magazine explosions, something the age of sail commanders did not have to worry about.
idiot

>I may be wrong, but I believe the battlecruisers won that, and while Fisher's concept of what the Americans called the "battle scout" might be sound, he was a moron for thinning the armour as much as he did.
That's because that wasn't realy the goal.
Fishers battlecruisers where always designed as cruiser killers and for that their armour is more than adequate. The lack of armour actualy points quite directly that those BCs where not main surface combatants ment for the battleline. The tTger and the german BCs where definetly ment for the battleline with armour that reflects this.

>Their primary task had always been in support of the main fleet, that is why they were not dispersed into trade escort groups. Don't forget, the Battle of Coronel should have included an RN battlecruiser if this was their primary task. It was not. Upon outbreak of war BCs were immediately concentrated into fleet scouting squadrons and used almost immediately at Heligoland Bight - this predates the Falklands.
You say that but you had the Australia hunting for Von Spee in the Pacific att that time and as soon as Fisher got back in comand he sent out the battlecruisers to do their job. A job that was preformed to perfection in the battle of the Falkland islands.

I don't have a source foe later dates but in October 1904 he wrote

>"At the present moment naval experience is not sufficiently ripe to abolish totally the building of battleships so long as other countries do not do so."

Fisher papers II. Page 41

His views were from my understanding that the fleets primary role during a conflict us to disrupt enemy trade and control of the sea. Thus principal surface combatants are only useful during the phase where battles happen and are redundant at all other times as they can not effectively pursue the primary purpose of the Fleet, that done by cruisers.

Thus the construction of battleships should be moderated as to not waste resources maintaining something with limited use.

Personally I regard him as a visionary and a genius but he was very full of himself and extremely stubborn.

He was one of the first people to warn of submarines and their danger to commerce.

Thus he wanted brittan to have more subs than anyone else.

I have a feeling that the same conversation we just had or atleast one verry simular to it was had att the time on how to actualy use the things considering how split the doctrinal theory and actual use was.
Especially looking att Beatys genius

This perfectly shows the brilliance of Beaty.
>our big ships with capital grade weapons primary job is to ANOY the enemies torpedo boats. Not destroy but anoy.

The battle-cruisers performance at jutland can not in good faith be placed in the hands of their designs. Their losses in the battle were caused to large degree due to Beattys comand, the disabling of security measures and the loading drills having put a large amount of cordite dust in the turrets, meaning they could explode to even a near miss.

As for your first statement I'd like to point out that the very role you say no one used BCs for is the reason that at the start of ww1 the New Zealand was in the med. To provide a counter to the German Battle cruiser SMS Moltke who had been patrolling the med until just before the war. Then we also have the fact that in ww2 the Germans attempted to employ battleships for the role.

Thus the idea of using BCs as commerce protection isn't unreasonable. It was simply a case of no one else having the resources to do so. And having the biggest and fastest commerce raider/protector is a very effective way to achieve total dominance over trade in a region. This logic is exemplified in this quote from Fisher from 1900 after learning about the construction of increasingly large armoured cruisers.

>In regard to Cruisers, the fact has been overlooked that no number of unprotected or unarmoured or smaller type of Cruisers can cope successfully with even one thoroughly powerful first-class armoured Cruiser. An infinite number of ants would not be equal to one armadillo! The armadillo would eat them up one after the other wholesale!"

The reason other's didn't use BCs for commerce duties to the extent the brittish did is that simply put no one else had the naval capacity to spare ships that are capable of fighting in a battle to commerce duty.

The brittish were and thus they did

Fisher's idea was that fleet engagements where outdated and that control of the season could be better achieved by harassing and denying anny attempts of fleet engagement.
And that wasn't realy feasible att the time and att best you can say that carriers in WW2 achieved that ideal.

They weren't tho.

Their use in fleet engagements were never as a replacement BB

They were in doctrine (during ww1 and the period leading up to it) consistently seen as the heaviest asset of the scouting force. The idea of sending a BC to fight a BB was always seen as somethingnot done. This was due to the lack of armor and thus survivability in such scenarios. The use in direct engagement was as a supporting asset basically only to engage when there us minimal chance of the enemy hitting back.

Fisher didn't think specifically BCs shouldn't fight in fleet engagements.

He thought fleet engagements were a excessively risky and dumb concepts and would prefer it if naval warfare was a series of cruiser actions. Ships are extremely expensive and time consuming to build so it is acording to Fisher best to risk them as little as possible and focus on what is actually important. Denying the enemy access to maritime commerce and guaranteeing your own.

His position on the war was that the British navy failed to preform the task of denying the Germans access to maritime trade. This is because they didn't disrupt Germany iron trade with Sweden.

To do this was the primary purpose of the batlic project.

He vehemently detested missions such as the dardanelles campaign and thought it a waste that Britain committed the BEF to fighting in France instead of keeping it available for a misson of a more expeditionary nature. That being the batlic project.

Which if successful would have (possibly we don't actually know the details as Fisher never shared them cause he didn't trust politicians) to bring Denmark into the war on the ententes side and then deploy the BEF in support of the Danes. Following which Danish ports would be used to base a fleet dedicated to interdiction of the iron trade.

This would most probably require the destruction of the German navy but it was primarily a deployment of brittish resources in the goal to complete the blocade of Germany

Well.

The army component would be basically helping the Danish army hold jutland.

It would be done instead of gallipoli using the regular British army.

Would possibly have ended poorly but atleast they wouldn't be stuck om a beach under fire from surrounding hills

You know the BEF preformed pretty well against the Germans on the western. You did know that right?

So instead of under equipped anzak units fighting turks in prepared defensive positions it would be the first line British units fighting whatever the Germans can spare without sacrificing the east or west front.

Supported by the Danish army.

Fisher's idea of a good ship was slapping the biggest engine and armament on it as posible and if there was space over add some armour.
And while I agree that his concept of a fleet entirely made upp of skirmish ships ment to trade blows att long range is verry flawed. That type of combat is verry diferent from the way battleships where made to fight. (And also not entirely productive to the RNs mission of owning the ocean considering such a force wouldn't be able to effectively contest a major fleet action)

>The first battlecruisers were designed in the United Kingdom, as a development of the armoured cruiser, at the same time as the dreadnought succeeded the pre-dreadnought battleship. The goal of the design was to outrun any ship with similar armament, and chase down any ship with lesser armament; they were intended to hunt down slower, older armoured cruisers and destroy them with heavy gunfire while avoiding combat with the more powerful but slower battleships.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battlecruiser

>The three Invincible-class battlecruisers were built for the Royal Navy and entered service in 1908 as the world's first battlecruisers... The Invincible-class ships were formally known as armoured cruisers until 1911.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invincible-class_battlecruiser'

>the trade protection bit is what came first
No, battlecruisers were always designed as fleet battle units first. Of course they were useful for dealing with particularly large enemy raiders, but this was a "nice to have" and most Empire trade protection cruiser squadrons didn't have battlecruisers attached. With 1, maybe 2 exceptions, tattlecruisers were always attached to a battle fleet.

They would have been useful in WW2 hunting down the graf spee, hipper, eugen, q-ships etc instead of sending squadrons of cruisers that still got outgunned.

Here is a quote by Admiral Sir Reginald H. S. Bacon, Fishers assistant and later the D.N.O about the purpose of the Battle cruiser

>"The speed of the Invincible was definitely fixed at 25 knots. This gave her some margin over the German Transatlantic liners. Hitherto we had subsidized, for a huge annual sum, some of our own liners to fight those of Germany, in spite of the fact that they had never been designed to fight and were totally unfitted to do so. For weeks, however, discussion continued about the armament of the Invincible 9.2-inch versus 12-inch; but in the end the 12-inch gun won on the unanswerable plea that ships, of the size and tonnage necessary in order to build an Invincible, should have an additional use in being able to form a fast light squadron to supplement the battleships in action, and worry the ships in the van or rear of the enemy's line. They were never intended to engage battleships singlehanded; but they were designed to assist in a general action by engaging some of the enemy's ships which were already fighting our battleships." The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone: Admiral of the Fleet. Volume One: page 256

As can be read the battle cruisers primary design purpose wasn't to be a fleet asset first commerce raider/protector second but the other way around.

Heavy cruisers grew out of light cruisers, the concept is relevant in regards to the naval treaties.

The battle cruiser was born out of engaged armoured cruisers.
There's also the comments about how they should be employed just before ww1 which were decidedly as a big cruiser.

>The 1913 naval manœuvres were productive, on two occasions, of experience of a battle-cruiser squadron keeping touch with a powerful force of enemy battleships under conditions of variable visibility by day, which, at times, necessitated them closing within gun range. This might or might not be desirable, according to circumstances and the composition of the enemy force, but, if the enemy is in superior strength, injury or disablement of the battle-cruisers might result with no compensating gain.
The lesson deduced is that battle-cruisers should be associated with light cruisers which will act as their "eyes," whilst they form the support which enables the light cruisers to maintain their position against all but ships of power equal to or greater than that of the battle-cruisers behind them.
Home Fleets General Orders concerning cruiser work, dated 29 April, 1914

Here we can observe an aversion to regarding the BCs as something to engage a battle line with. Due to lacking armor.

It doesn't go as far as Beatty did writing to Callaghan on July 2nd
>Tactically the position of the B.C.S. in Battle is to such as to be able to frustrate the attacks of the Enemy's T.B.s on our Battle Fleet.

The shift to seeing them as a line asset happened during the war after they had successfully completed their primary task and crippling the central powers commerce raiders. Sitting in the cannel ports people started seeing them more as faster battleships rather than the large cruisers they actually were.

>Heavy cruisers grew out of light cruisers, the concept is relevant in regards to the naval treaties
No
Treaty light cruisers (different animal from WW1 light cruisers) were a phenomenon forced by the naval treaties, otherwise the trend would have been simply to build bigger and bigger heavy cruisers.

Interwar heavy cruisers was WW1 light cruisers receiving bigger armament and more armour, but no longer taking the role of fleet scout, which was left to battlecruisers and fast battleships.

>an additional use
Not a primary use.

>The british battleships present an anomaly in this instance due to negligence of safety procedures (such as leaving blast doors wide open and haphazard storage of ammunition in favour for rate of fire)
the british battlecruisers, the british battleships stood up very well as well, indeed the biggest problem they had was the germans running out of range

[...]
the invincibles had 4 twin 12 inch turrets for 8 guns not 4 guns

[...]
Glorious, Furious and Courageous, better known in the lower decks of the RN as Spurious, Curious and Outrageous, were built for a specific mission, operations in support of a planed invasion on germanys baltic coast, the requirement was high speed, low draft and high gunpower

I apologize, I got my ships mixed up. Still, couldn't they just move closer to the target to get more accuracy? Even if they might be in range of the enemy, they still have equal armor and a firepower advantage

This is the biggest flaw of the pre dreadnought.

Their many secondary armaments weren't particularly useful at the extended ranges of the primary guns.

Couple that with the less developed rangefinders you had a situation where ships were encouraged to get closer to the enemy. Thus increasing the proportion of weapons that could be of use and the accuracy.

This in turn means that fights turn into the naval equivalent of a knife fight. And in a knife fight you don't win you survive.

The introduction of the unified main battery you suddenly had a ship that has more of the biggest guns and eliminating the waste caused by the smaller guns. Meaning the ship can engage at further range and doesn't waste space on smaller guns