When did the WP go from "fricked" to "not a chance in hell"?

It's such a fast transformation, from the so-so "parity" of the 70s (BMP armaments still threaten every NATO mbt, T-64s impervious to APDS, Flogger relative parity with F-4) to the absolute roflstomp skullfrick of the 80s (F-15 and 16 rape flankers and fulcrums in BVR combat, NATO sabot swiss cheeses every pact tank except the soviet cream of the crop (T-80B, T-72B), complete superiority in FCS for artillery, thermal sights lead to one sided rape fests)
When did the switch flip, and what was the final straw for it to do so?

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  1. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    I shoved a bunch of coins in my ass.

  2. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    microelectronics

  3. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    The MIC was able to control the show and increase their own budgets under Reagan. Also the digital revolution happened and Russia didn't have enough money to invest in it in a manner to benefit in a bug way.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >and Russia didn't have enough money to invest in it in a manner to benefit in a bug way.
      It wasn't entirely that they didn't have the capacity, so much as that Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were all moronic doctrinaires who stuck to Lenin's original idea that you have to develop heavy industry before anything else. The USSR had no capacity for intensive development, because between 1945 and 1984 their blueprint for increasing output was literally to just build copies of existing factories, without investing in efficiency increases. Kosygin already recognised this in the 1960s, but his reforms were neutered by, you guessed it, Brezhnev.

      Every Warsaw Pact country followed the USSR's moronic example (as did Vietnam, for that matter, leading to a famine in the late 80s) except for East Germany, who made it their explicit goal to become a leading exporter of electronics, mostly via VEB Kombinat Robotron. Despite some heroic efforts, they just barely managed to get within 4-5 years behind the West before everything went a bit Ceausescu-shooty.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        > As the GDR was unable to catch up with the West, the idea was to invest heavily to achieve a "leap" in the most modern industries of the time and then to reap profits from exporting products that would be a generation ahead of the West. ... From 1977 the attempt to achieve a competitive edge in microchips against the research and development resources of the entire western world – in a state of just 16 million people – was perhaps always doomed to failure, but swallowed increasing amounts of internal resources and hard currency.
        > GDR was some five to eight years behind the leading producers of USA and Japan.

  4. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >Flogger relative parity with F-4
    lol
    lmao
    the flogger was arguably worse than the fishbed

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      it had similar tech specs, is this something i'm missing where half the radars died and the missiles were all flukes or am i mistaken?
      i'm mostly talking bvr mind you
      can you ideally get me some numbers on this? I thought the one that killed it was the f-15, not the f-4

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        The flogger was a death trap that was as mechanically complex as the F-14 without anything resembling the US' funding and expertise needed to keep them in one piece. Floggers killed more Soviet pilots than any enemy action by sole virtue of it being a clunky piece of shit that could barely maneuver in ideal conditions, let alone win fights against NATO's elite. The only good fighter the Soviets really had around that period was the Foxbat and that was purely based on the fact that it could engage and frick off at will, which is why it's the only Soviet aircraft to ever claim a kill on a 4th gen NATO aircraft.

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          is there a source you can provide for this? like dude, I can't just trust you when you say this with 0 evidence. if the fighter was faulty enough to not be able to maneuver, it wouldn't have been used, no?
          but given russians there is probably an entire report in a historical book going over how they did just that

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/yes-us-air-force-pilots-flew-russian-mig-23-fighters-they-hated-them-141207
            >Overall, the squadron crashed an airplane roughly every thousand flight hours, an accident rate 30 times the Air Force average at the time.

            • 3 weeks ago
              Anonymous

              the entire squadron lost an airplane once every 1000 hours
              not just the mig 23s
              and this is frankly to be expected given these guys had manual and parts shortages
              and this still doesn't make it combat incapable, otherwise the (competent) US Army wouldn't have bothered even flying it or training against it
              there are plenty of valid reasons to hate slavshit, so stop inventing them

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            >if the fighter was faulty enough to not be able to maneuver, it wouldn't have been used, no?
            This was the USSR anon.

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            >is there a source you can provide for this?
            Where are YOUR sources, butthole?

  5. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >When did the switch flip
    Commies lie, necer trust a commie.

  6. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    NATO/the US were keenly aware of their material deficiencies and disadvantages against the USSR/WP. All that tech development you mentioned (tank FCS/thermals, APFSDS, avionics and missiles, etc.) had been steadily progressing since the 60s rather than appearing out of nowhere. Hell, the F-14 first saw service late in Vietnam, so it came at just about the time when the US military was the weakest in the Cold War.
    All it took was proper funding and expansion of the military at the right time for this tech to roll out and go into large scale frontline use, which happened under Reagan.

  7. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    any yet, once a region comes under control of Russian weapons it stays that way, regardless of politics.

    try as they might, not matter how many trillions and how many troops get PTSD and maimed, everyone understands stuff like Iraq and Afghan Wars are "only a matter of time before Russian Weapons armed people are back in control".

    its like doing a few "rails" of Meth, VS a legit long term fitness and workout program. 🙂

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      esoteric cope

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      The USSR was kicked out of Afghanistan with Lee Enfields and Stingers.
      Libya was kicked out of Chad (based) with MILANs and Toyota Hiluxes.
      Iraq was curb stomped by the US twice and now currently has a largely US-equipped military.
      The only reason why you see an apparent pattern is because Soviet/Russian weapons were the cheapest shit you could get and they gave them to every dictatorship and insurgency in the world. Nowadays, Western surplus and Chinese weapons are cheaper and comparable or superior in quality while also being more widely available (they also won't try to scam you like they did to Algeria)
      The age of Russian weapons is over.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >once a region comes under control of Russian weapons it stays that way
      Egypt
      Indonesia
      Poland
      Baltic countries

  8. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >muh equipment

    You're looking for around 1980 when the Post-Vietnam reforms gained traction and the US transitioned towards a properly professional military doctrine complete with more realistic combined arms training, empowering officers on the ground (and to an extent policing the NCO grades), better pay and conditions, new training schools like Top Gun, but above all a focus on command and control both on the defence but also offensively. Definitely by the time of Urgent Fury when the US had moulded into the force that would later stomp Iraq in the Gulf War.

    The Cold War was arguably decided in the 1950s if not the 40s in hindsight but I absolutely would not want to be an American officer in 1969 who needed to order his drug-addicted men to play some autistic numbers game in West Germany.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      do you think that the us would still win if the equipment was magically switched between the two?
      bonus difficulty would be late cold war

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        Yeah, tankers in the Gulf War even said it about Saddam's army.

        >bonus difficulty would be late cold war
        >Soviet F-117s being used in mass air-offensives

        The Soviet doctrinal weakness was its reliance on C&C and having absolutely no trust in the common soldier, an issue made worse by a reliance on centrally planned offensives. So long as NATO could still cripple the Soviet hierarchy and communication you'd see a collapse.

  9. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Once in the late 70s the Soviet Army lost the battle for the crops and was transformed in to a massive pool of slave labor for the soviet agriculture sector..it was pretty much over. Then they also made sure to boot Marshal Ograkov, who was the only one with a bit of sense to see where the future of warfare is going.

  10. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    There never was parity between Nato and WP forces, the only area in which NATO had the advantage was in naval warfare everything else was comically lopsided. Yeah, sure 1 on 1 most NATO equipment was somewhat superior but we're talking about 1 excellent piece of gear versus 6-10 okay pieces. Maybe NATO had a decent shot in 1988/1989 but that's about it

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      Yeah, Desert Storm showed us the true power of Soviet equipment.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        I think you're overstating it, mostly due to anachronism. Yes, by 1980, NATO in theory had substantially more advanced weapons in virtually every sector. In practice, it did not field these weapons in high numbers until the last two or three years of the Cold War. Even as late as 1985, the vast majority of NATO's tank fleets had the same firepower they had had twenty years prior. NATO fielded fewer than 7000 tanks of its latest generation by 1990. The significant majority of NATO's tank fleets: M60's, Chieftains, and Leopard 1's, were substantially outclassed in both firepower and protection compared to Warsaw Pact tanks from the T-64 onward, and were on-par with the T-62, and even the T-55 (especially modernized versions in service with the Pact countries) remained competitive with them. Prospects admittedly look much better for NATO in the air, thought a sustained SEAD campaign against Soviet air defense would be difficult under pressure from Soviet ground forces and due to the sheer size of Soviet interdiction forces.

        NTA but people are very quick to forget that the Gulf War was some of the best equipment facing off against Soviet equipment that was often two generations behind. Not counting the T-72M (as it was in service with much of the Warsaw Pact countries and was a mainline tank with them), but the T-72M made up a relatively small minority of Iraqi armor, which was mostly T-55's or Type 69's (Chinese T-54 variant). Moreover, the Iraqis were strategically outnumbered and isolated and as such opted to take a defensive stance that played directly into NATO doctrine allowing a lengthy SEAD and air campaign that was mostly uninterrupted, but which even then took a substantial amount of time. In a different operational environment such as the internal German border, it seems unlikely that Pact forces would have entirely forfeited the operational initiative to NATO airpower, and a lengthy SEAD campaign would face significant (1/2)

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          (2/2) disruption from not only a dense AD net, but from interdictions from the expansive Soviet and Pact air forces, which, while at significant disadvantage, were large and would be time consuming to deal with, and from Soviet SRBM and IRBM capabilities, which would have prioritized NATO airfields, as the Pact was quite aware of the superiority of NATO equipment in this regard. Add to this the significant pressure which ground forces would be under, and, operationally, NATO would still face a significant challenge from Pact forces even as late as 1987-89, though I lean towards the idea that a major Soviet outbreak would have been contained, as Soviet planners themselves believed. Basically, while NATO had achieved technological superiority by 1980, it would take until the mid-80's for production of much of this equipment to be strategically a game changer, and as such, the end of the Cold War took place before NATO countries produced this equipment in sufficient numbers to have fully negated the enormous material advantages possessed by a hypothetical Warsaw Pact invasion of West Germany.

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            On the other hand, we've learned the last couple of years that the Russians *never* fully mechanized their logistics, and were almost entirely reliant upon mobiks moving wooden crates, and would have had trouble operating more than a few dozen miles from the nearest railhead once their initial supplies ran low.

            Surely their logistics would have been better than they are today, right? But... how much better? Could they have made it to the Rhine without running out of supplies and losing all mobility?

        • 3 weeks ago
          Anonymous

          >against Soviet equipment that was often two generations behind
          My brown friend, that's what the soviet army actually fielded in numbers. Why do you think T-62s literally fought in russia's 2008 war against Georgia? Soviets _technically_ had newer stuff, but don't be delusional to think that it ever was the bulk of the army.

          • 3 weeks ago
            Anonymous

            The T-64, T-72, and T-80 were the bulk of Soviet tank forces in Europe, the T-62 was withdrawn from service in the European theater by the Soviet Army and placed into units in Afghanistan, the Caucuses, and the Sino-Mongolian border, where it was appraised that the T-62 remained relevant against local forces. Again, consult the chart, the Soviets possessed nearly 10,000 T-64 and T-72 each, and another 2800 T-80's, by 1987. They nevertheless still had nearly 14,000 T-62's (mostly the M variant in pic related) in service in secondary theaters mentioned above.

  11. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Computing. The Soviets never invested much into electronic computing, in a classic example of a major flaw of command economies.
    The powers that be didn't see the benefit, so focused on other things. The US started introducing electronic computers to stuff in the 80's and it was all uphill from there.

    • 3 weeks ago
      Anonymous

      >The Soviets never invested much into electronic computing, in a classic example of a major flaw of command economies
      >The powers that be didn't see the benefit, so focused on other things
      Not that simple. Soviet planners actually believed that computers would solve the economic calculation problem.
      The computer gap arguably started in the 60s, became a certainty in the 70s, and by the 80s it was joever. Along with the issues seen in authoritarian states (Soviets had more emphasis on theory and quality of education than Americans but then gave very little freedom for experimentation) by the early 70s they knew they had a computer gap so they decided to copy the IBM/360 and use pirated Western software. In an attempt to keep up with the West, they actually kneecapped their own domestic computing and software industry. In a period of rapid development the Soviets were stuck waiting for espionage and sanctions-busting to get hardware and software through the iron curtain, where they were forced to study and reverse engineer stuff that was already outdated.

      • 3 weeks ago
        Anonymous

        >Soviet planners actually believed that computers would solve the economic calculation problem.

        I'd say the planners saw it but the cyberneticists were all imprisoned in the 1950s when the edge was lost and then when it was rehabilitated it was subsumed into power dynamics bullshit and self-sabotage as different organisations sought to create the dominant operating system. Even when it did gain traction and a realistic plan to make a quantum leap with OGAS it was eventually destroyed by a leadership that saw the clear threat it posed in information distribution and new economics to the entrenched power structure of industrial cliques.

        Although let's be honest the whole system was doomed first by the existential need to develop heavy industry in the 1920-1940s and then by the need to deliver unsustainable defence spending to compete with the far more prosperous western world. And we probably will never see China try it either because as there's no defining ideology these days beyond Xi spouting nationalisms.

  12. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    There was no single event, WP gradually scaled down the scope and speed of planned operations from around 1976 until 1988. Near the end they even got rid of defensive scenarios in which WP counterattacks cross East German border. Considering it takes 1-2 years to do analytical and planning work and some additional time to convert soviet plans to WP plans, they knew how fricked they were around 1985-1986

  13. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    Unironically when the microcomputer took off. Digital computing completely broke open precision warfare and the Soviets missed the boat.

  14. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >"80's" tech was all designed in the 60s/early 70s
    >soviets were a husk by the 70s
    >russia cant even take over eastern ukraine for the past 10 years

  15. 3 weeks ago
    Anonymous

    >what was the final straw
    microelectronics

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