US nuclear buildup

STRATCOM bossmang said a return to MIRVs should be given serious consideration. This is one of the recommendations in last year's Strategic Posture Review (not the Nuclear Posture Review). ITT re-MIRVing, 'uploading' and such. Watching this: https://youtu.be/DKuWPX7NBh4

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  1. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    His only mention of MIRVs in his prepared comments:

    >As I reported to Congress in January 2023, the PRC’s arsenal of land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers currently exceeds that of the United States. Today, the PRC likely has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads and, should it continue building weapons at its current pace, could have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. In 2022, it built three new ICBM fields, with at least 300 missile silos, each capable of housing the solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 2 ICBM. The PRC also maintains road mobile CSS-20 ICBMs, each armed with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), and is developing a new generation of mobile ICBMs. These developments, combined with the PRC's increasing counter-space and cyber capabilities, pose a complex, but not insurmountable challenge to U.S. strategic deterrence.
    https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/cotton_statement.pdf

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      When will normies face the reality that these subhuman shitholes prey on fear and are now scrambling for nuclear weapons because they know it scares off the west.
      >b-but muh arms race
      They are already doing a one-sided arms race, they actively seek and desire a new cold war because lasting peace causes them to collapse.

  2. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN FISHER
    Thank you Mr. Chairman. Last October, the bipartisan, bicameral, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States released their final report on America's strategic posture. Its findings were sobering.

    We face two major nuclear adversaries for the first time in history and we are woefully underprepared to address this future threat environment. In their report, the commissioners also unanimously endorsed 81 recommendations.

    If we can act upon most of these, the United States should retain the capability and the capacity to maintain a safe, reliable, effective, and credible nuclear deterent throughout the next several decades.

    Over the coming months I'm going to be working with my colleagues on this committee to include many of these recommendations in FY 2025 NDAA. General Cotton, I appreciate our earlier conversations about this Strategic Posture Commission's report and your very careful review and consideration of their findings and recommendations.

    Do you agree with the commissioners' statement that: "The nuclear force modernization programs [sic] of record is absolutely essential, although not sufficient to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China, and that the elements of the programs [sic] of record should be completed on time, expedited wherever possible, and expanded as needed" ?

    GEN COTTON
    I do, Senator.

  3. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN FISHER
    And can you please, uh, provide the committee with your views on which of those commissioners' recommendations you think are the most important, or that we should be prioritizing.

    GEN COTTON
    Thank you for the question Senator Fisher. Y'know, I was probably one of the first to receive the outbrief from [Madelyn Creedon - Chair] and [Jon Kyl - Vice Chair], when it came to the results of the commission. And it validated many of the things that we were looking at in-house, in Strategic Command, in regards [of] what do we do with the current arsenal and the stockpile. I have memorized what I would consider pages 48 and 49 of the commission, which has the 81 recommendations. Of those, I have prioritized what I think should be the things that we get after first.

    I do believe that we need to take serious consideration in seeing what uploading and and re-MIRVING the ICBM looks like. And what does that, what does it take to potentially do that. I do believe that we need to have a conversation in regards to, how do we have - because part of that report also says the importance of having a credible and effective conventional force. Part of that is looking at and ensuring that we have the right long range standoff conventional weapons as well, that can be placed on a bomber as an example.

    And then the look at what does all legs of the triad look like, in regards of capacity, and how can you expand capacity. And how do you build the modernized force that has modularity and where we can always keep pace, as opposed to the current system that we have that it's really hard to do.

    [ed - the man stammers a lot. i'm cleaning it up in transcript.]

  4. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN KING
    Thank you Mr. Chairman. We think about what's going on here in this room - this hearing is undoubtedly being watched in real time in Moscow and Beijing. And, General Cotton, the focus of this hearing will naturally be on gaps, and work that's under progress, and what the problems are, but I want you to restate what you stated in your opening testimony for the benefit of our audience far away: you are ready to fight, tonight, with an awesome response to anyone who attacks this country. Is that correct?

    GEN COTTON
    The men and women that represent United States Strategic Command are ready to defend, if a strategic deterrence failure happens, tonight. We are ready today.

    SEN KING
    And the capacity of the triad, right now, is at an actionable level. We are not- I don't want anybody to get the impression that we're somehow crippled in terms of our nuclear deterrent. You have the forces you need to defend the country and also to impose unthinkable costs on a potential adversary, isn't that correct?

    GEN COTTON
    I do.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      I think it speaks volumes of the moronation of Chinese leaders that this part even had to be included. There's a world where they take this hearing as an admission of weakness and get even bolder

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        This is normal for them, they see this as "open admission of weakness" since their (+Russia and other thirdies) attitudes are just to lie more and boast to sound big when weak. Cultural incompatibility moment. Some countries ignore the big stick thinking that it is paper mache and try to start shit over the speak softly part.

  5. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    How exactly is this helping Ukraine?

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Falseflagging tard

  6. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN KING
    General Whiting, you talked about-we have the best space capability and have for many, many years. That's the good news. The bad news is the dependency that we have on space, which makes us asymmetrically vulnerable in terms of the relationship with these potential adversaries. What are we doing to think about alternatives to space? For example, I understand recently they're now teaching celestial navigation at Annapolis again. We need to be thinking about how do we reduce our reliance on space assets given the development of anti-space capabilities of our adversaries. Talk to me about how we mitigate this risk.

    GEN WHITING
    Senator thank you for the question. We've gone to space because of the advantages it brings us. It allows us to operate globally, untethered to terrestrial networks and that-

    SEN KING
    And we were unopposed for years.

    GEN WHITING
    Yes sir. And that gives us a unique advantage. But to your point, and I know all the services are thinking about this, what do we do when our primary capability may not be available? Now, in Space Command, it's our job to make sure that that doesn't happen. But no doubt the services have to train what their secondary plans are and all of them have those plans in place, and to your point, are training those to their people. Several of the services, such as the Army, the Navy, and the Marines, also have relatively small, but dedicated cadres of space personnel to help their commanders understand the benefits and the vulnerabilities of space so they can understand when those times might be that they would have to go to those secondary or tertiary plans.

  7. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN KING
    Well now I'm going to talk about those gaps that we've that I mentioned at the beginning, that I don't want to overemphasize. You have partial responsibility for missile defense. It bothers me that we've been very slow on the issue of directed energy. We're using 2 million dollar or 5 million dollar missiles to knock down 200- or 300 thousand dollar drones. This should be a task for directed energy. I hope that that's part of missile defense, missile awareness, and that all branches – not you necessarily, but all the branches – should be working on two things: missile defense and hypersonic defense. Those are strategic game changers that I think we've been slow to develop. Is directed energy going to be part of the future of missile defense?

    GEN WHITING
    Sir, just two weeks ago I was in Huntsville, meeting with the Missile Defense Agency and we talked about directed energy. And I know that is something they're looking at and I agree with you senator, I think it needs to be part of our future.

    SEN KING
    I want more than looking at. I want development and soon. I think we should be having a capability in the Red Sea right now, that this is an opportunity to use that capacity.

    And finally I just want to associate myself with my co-chair Senator Fisher on NC3. That is part of the triad. I congratulate you on the work that you're doing, but urge you to accelerate and continue. Because the whole idea- the cornerstone of defense of this country is deterrence. And to the adversary, [to] detect a weakness in our deterrence and NC3 is the glue that holds it all together- we're vulnerable. And so, I say, I congratulate you but want to prod you to keep going earnestly and accelerate the progress on that issue.

  8. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN COTTON
    General Cotton, General Whiting, welcome. Thank you for your testimony this morning and I extend my thanks to all the men and women who serve under your commands. General Cotton: since Xi Jinping took power a little over a decade ago, China's nuclear arsenal has increased by more than 100%. By 2035 the department anticipates that China's nuclear arsenal will have increased by 500%. How would you characterize the threat posed to the United States by China's rapidly growing nuclear arsenal?

    GEN COTTON
    You know as my predecessor said, and I love using this terminology because it is, the breakout that we saw, and the advancements and how quickly the advancements that we're seeing on China to rapidly create a viable triad, is breathtaking.

    SEN COTTON
    Unprecedented? The pace at which they're expanding?

    GEN COTTON
    It is.

    SEN COTTON
    And your statement says that they have a triad today, is that correct?

    GEN COTTON
    That is correct, senator.

    SEN COTTON
    It may not be the most cutting edge versions of it, the bombers may require standoff weapons, but they're working on stealth bombers. Is that correct?

    GEN COTTON
    That is correct.

  9. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    [...]

    SEN COTTON
    It'll shock everyone to hear that Chinese Communists have a history of lying. Not just about their nuclear weapons. The Tibetans would probably have something to say about that. Let's look at what we're doing to counteract this threat. Well, first actually, let's sit on the threat. How does China's nuclear arsenal compare to ours today?

    GEN COTTON
    Today we're still superior in there but, like I said I think the reality is we're going to have to continue to modernize our current systems. We are superior to them today.

    SEN COTTON
    Today, yes. If China continues on the pace on which the department projects, by 2035, will they have achieved parity with the United States?

    GEN COTTON
    In the realm of their land-based systems, yes.

    SEN COTTON
    Okay. And what if you combined the total forces of China and Russia by 2035 - would those two countries combined have nuclear overmatch against the United States on the current pace?

    GEN COTTON
    Well the weapons count would uh would be larger than our weapons count.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Cotton is avoiding straight answers really hard here.
      >asked about parity
      >talks only about the nuclear sponge branch
      >asked about adversary overmatch
      >talks about warhead count

      What I get from this is that they're trying to paint the most dire picture possible, chinese SSBN threat is negligible for the next 30 years and their nukes are less effective pound for pound compared to the new MIRV superfuses

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        There's an inherited reason for that. The NDAA codified a requirement for STRATCOM to notify congress if STRATCOM
        >determines that the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active inventory of China exceeds the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active inventory of the United States, the number of nuclear warheads equipped on such missiles of China exceeds the number of nuclear warheads equipped on such missiles of the United States, or the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in China exceeds the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in the United States[.]
        >[Public Law 117-81 § 1648. Notification regarding intercontinental ballistic missiles of China.]

        That happened in early 2023. Some congressmen then made a stink about the lack of disclosure in open session, which is tantamount to a soft disclosure that the land leg "parity" trigger of ICBM silos has been met. Since that time, the land leg is the only one they discuss in detail in unclassified context.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          All of which is to say: the natural instinct for someone like the commander of stratcom is usually going to be to see if they can get away with saying nothing at all. And that one little tripwire in the NDAA is the only reason they do have to say something more than nothing in public session.

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            There's an inherited reason for that. The NDAA codified a requirement for STRATCOM to notify congress if STRATCOM
            >determines that the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active inventory of China exceeds the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active inventory of the United States, the number of nuclear warheads equipped on such missiles of China exceeds the number of nuclear warheads equipped on such missiles of the United States, or the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in China exceeds the number of intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in the United States[.]
            >[Public Law 117-81 § 1648. Notification regarding intercontinental ballistic missiles of China.]

            That happened in early 2023. Some congressmen then made a stink about the lack of disclosure in open session, which is tantamount to a soft disclosure that the land leg "parity" trigger of ICBM silos has been met. Since that time, the land leg is the only one they discuss in detail in unclassified context.

            I see, that's interesting anon. Thank you

  10. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    He then asks about engine modernization of the B52. I always forget how exhausting it is to transcribe dumb people trying to sound smart

  11. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Warren then says prickly things about how
    >they didn't listen
    about Sentinel in the past, tries to press for an affirmative response to the prospect of independent/external assessment of Sentinel. Receives muddled, dithering reaction from Cotton.

  12. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    SEN ROUNDS
    Today we're talking about some of the most strategic weapons systems that our country has.

    Brilliant analysis

  13. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Around the halfway mark, the hawaii question on space elements of national guard units - this is the first time I've seen it addressed anywhere at a high level.

    Context:
    https://desuarchive.org/k/thread/60362031/#q60389844

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      timestamp

      ?t=4070

  14. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    >stratcom has no spacecom liaison
    That reminds me of what might be the most do-nothing command in the entire US military:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Marine_Corps_Forces_Strategic_Command

  15. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    GEN WHITING
    North Korea has demonstrated an electromagnetic warfare capability that could have impact against our space systems and then we're also very carefully watching their space systems

    dafuq is he referring to?

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      >dafuq is he referring to?
      Lostech from the Finno-Korean Hyperwar.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Must have watched the Red Dawn remake.

  16. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    this is a response to increased Chinese aim points, a way to increase warhead count using existing delivery systems.

    It's not exactly ideal though, MIRVed silo ICBMs work less well as damage sponges and have a somewhat destabilatory effect.

    One edge I think the US has on China is in conventional counterforce. The US has basically the entire Pacific as strategic depth.
    US conventional assets in the western Pacific can basically shoot directly into mainland China.
    Stuff like VLS launched hypersonic weapons are much more of a headache for Chinese strategic planners than the US.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      >It's not exactly ideal though, MIRVed silo ICBMs work less well as damage sponges and have a somewhat destabilatory effect.
      Work less well as damage sponges compared to what?

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Single-warhead ICBMs. Putting more than one warhead doesn't change the number of nukes allocated to destroying that silo, but it does decrease the amount of silos you can fill.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          >but it does decrease the amount of silos you can fill.
          How so? The context of re-MIRVing is the expiration of arms treaties that previously capped warhead count

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            >How so?
            If you put 2 warheads on each ICBM, you double the nuke expenditure for the land-based leg of the triad, with minimal gains.

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              Not really a limiting factor unless the W87-1's eye watering meme pricing turns out to be a real thing

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                >How so?
                If you put 2 warheads on each ICBM, you double the nuke expenditure for the land-based leg of the triad, with minimal gains.

                Honestly all the possible extra budget should go to expanding the ICBM fields. 400 silos don't guarantee sponging up a combined russia-china launch. 700 might

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                >400 silos don't guarantee sponging up a combined russia-china launch
                That's assuming Russia and China won't also launch on each other.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                When it comes to nuclear deterrence there's no such thing as overspending. I think a larger nuclear sponge is needed in any world where china isn't a starving backwater country

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              That only matters when warhead count is limited by treaty or limited funding. If you have no treaties and are willing to spend lots of money, you can have large numbers of missiles and even larger numbers of warheads.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                >That only matters when warhead count is limited by treaty or limited funding. If you have no treaties and are willing to spend lots of money, you can have large numbers of missiles and even larger numbers of warheads.
                Yeah, but the point of silos is to soak up enemy nukes in a counterforce strike. Having more nukes per silo doesn't help soak up more nukes, so it's better to put those warheads where they actually matter, SSBNs.

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            >How so?
            If you put 2 warheads on each ICBM, you double the nuke expenditure for the land-based leg of the triad, with minimal gains.

            Hard to do MIRV in combination with dial-a-yield.

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              >Hard to do MIRV in combination with dial-a-yield.
              This seems like bullshit.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                RV's are quite small, there's only so much you can pack into them.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                speaking of recreational vehicles, this pic from the ground of ERS-2 burning up in reentry is neat. Captured by TIRA at fraunhofer institute in deutschland

  17. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Not about to let shills post slide threads about a stratcom hornyposter instead of linking it here
    https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/air-force-employee-indicted-unlawful-disclosure-classified-national-defense-information

  18. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    >return to MIRVs

    ...they got rid of MIRV's at some point?

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Yeah, to economize warheads after limits imposed by bilateral treaties with russia.

      >That only matters when warhead count is limited by treaty or limited funding. If you have no treaties and are willing to spend lots of money, you can have large numbers of missiles and even larger numbers of warheads.
      Yeah, but the point of silos is to soak up enemy nukes in a counterforce strike. Having more nukes per silo doesn't help soak up more nukes, so it's better to put those warheads where they actually matter, SSBNs.

      The commentary can easily be read as support for re-MIRVing tridents as well. Some of them are single warhead for New START requirements.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        >The commentary can easily be read as support for re-MIRVing tridents as well.
        Yeah, because that actually matters. If you can hit more targets in a second strike and have the ability to cripple your opponent even if all subs but one are sunk, it's a greater deterrent for a first strike. Unlike MIRVing ICBMs, putting multiple warheads in SLBMs does make them more effective at their job.

  19. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Just pull the trigger already.
    Let it burn.
    Give the Earth to bones and ashes.

  20. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Imagine how they'll feel when they launch those "nukes" and they're just normal bombs.

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