Rorke's Drift

did weapons or tactics make the difference?

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  1. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Just watched the movie Zulu again and it's always surprising how the Zulus routed the British in the convoy and got so close to overrunning the "fort" considering the tech disparity.

    Also were Zulu chants more effective than British trumpet communication or worse?

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      >not even 150 total british troops at the garrison
      >against literal thousands of zulus
      Yeah they fricking better have been routed.

  2. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Are you serious? Of course it was the weapons

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      if I didnt say weapons in OP they would ban me to PrepHole

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Then why Isandlwana?

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        >Didn't prepare defenses properly, weren't vigilant enough because of overconfidence
        >Caught completely by surprise
        >Ammo boxes

        Wasnt this the battle were the ammo crates were screwed shut and they had like 2 screwdrivers? Also the bongs sop called for one crate to be opened at a time instead of popping em all and passing it around


        >Solar eclipse gave cover to close distance during attack

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Because the terrain the British camped on was completely flat and the Zulu outnumbered them 10-1. The shvartzers went around the British line and engaged them on all sides, happily eating the casualties

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Because once the British used up the ready ammunition in their pouches they didn't get resupplied and they got zergrushed. Also outnumbered like 30 to 1.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      OP is a federal agent, paid to slide this board 24 hours a day. This thread serves no purpose.

  3. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    An engineer in the right place at the right time.

  4. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    a combination
    the guns wouldn't have made the difference had their gunnery drills not been so effective, particularly their volley fire. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volley_fire
    This boils down to discipline and confidence in the guys around you. Training and leadership.

    The brits had it down to a tee. hence why they were able to defeat most who they came against.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      god I love that movie. need to watch it sometime.

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        again*

  5. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    The Zulu weren't savages, they had guns themselves.
    But they were more suited for maneuver warfare and inexperienced in sieges.

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      from the movie it seems like they spent too many resources "testing" different sides of the fort and they could have easily taken it with one large assault

      • 2 months ago
        Anonymous

        The Zulu who attacked at Rorke’s Drift were the equivalent of their reserves. They actually weren’t supposed to attack in the overall strategy.

        • 2 months ago
          Anonymous

          QRD?

          • 2 months ago
            Anonymous

            QRD: Rorke's Drift mission is on the Natal (British colonial province) side of the Buffalo river, and King Cetschawayo specifically forbade any attacks outside of Zululand as he didn't want to invoke any casus belli of the Europeans.

            >long version
            In the Anglo-Zulu war of 1879, the Anglos were 100% the bad guys. The entire casus belli was bullshit and an excuse to raid the only economically stable region in South Africa at the time, which says a lot about Anglo mismanagement considering a feudal state based around cattle wasn't hemorrhaging money like British Natal.
            Shepstone (previous governor of Natal) and others started pushing narratives like productivity was down in Natal because of fears of Zulu neighbors although they haven't been belligerent in almost a generation; while ignoring (because they were the ones profiting from) the land consolidation which prevented free farmers from emigrating to Natal (no incentive for a tenant farmer or workshop shlub in Britain to go to the African hinterland to not even get their own land).

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              Found the little woke soiboi

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                history is not woke Black person

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            King zulu assigned them as reserves but the head of the unit wanted a taste of victory like his buddies at islandwana and disobeyed orders to both pursue the survivors and then engage them at Rorke's drift, with disastrous consequences
            Why the Zulus never had any realistic chance of overpowering the British in the field the disaster at Islandwana may have tipped public opinion in favour of ending the war were it not for Rorke's drift.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          >The sun was in their eyes

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      I can't paste the quote, but the Zulus were fond of firing off a single volley at long range, often having aimed high, and then dropping the guns to charge.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Heh. Just like Scottish border reivers back in the day.

  6. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Wasnt this the battle were the ammo crates were screwed shut and they had like 2 screwdrivers? Also the bongs sop called for one crate to be opened at a time instead of popping em all and passing it around

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      No, that was Isandlwanawhere the British were fricked. Thats why the Brit government made such a big fuss about the mediocre victory at Rorke's Drift later and handed out Victoria Crosses liek candy.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Butthurt nig detected.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          Pic related is the first "butthurt nig" to make that argument, the very same year of the battle of Rorke's Drift, after he had taken over overall command in the theatre from Chelmsford that July. Develop education.

          Found the little woke soiboi

          Develop vocabulary for yourself and some education beyond films and internet memes.

          What made the Natal Native Contingent so skittish about engaging the Zulu anyway? My understanding was that most of them were recruited from tribes that were sworn enemies of and had been previously oppressed by the Zulu. If anything, they should have been more enthusiastic about it than the British even.

          The sworn enemies part would've been from events that happened generations ago, and it's often said African peoples are fleetingly temporal in their mindset usually. They also were not reliable in battle generally and would break (Chelmsford's experience fighting the Xhosa in Cape Colony gave him a disregard of African forces and may have been why he was so casual regarding his camp defense), which is why they were usually given unimportant tasks like managing supply train or picketing "low danger zone" regions. Also if anything regarding their "old enemy" the Zulu was still around in their mindset it would add to their relative reluctance to engage in pitched battle with them.

          Zululand of Cetschwayo's day is a far cry from the days of Shaka or even Mpande, and the region's geopolitical setup was much different with the British consolidation of South African and the Boers forced inland. By the time of the 1879 Anglo-Zulu war, the mass majority of the Zulu army had never been in a legitimate fight before.

  7. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Michael Caine was great in that movie

  8. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    >Zulus cut down thousands of british soldiers like grass
    >suddenly get their asses handed to them by 100 or so cripples, engineers, and a literal choir
    Irl kino

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Not even 1000 british soldiers died

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        British losses at Isandlwana we're over 1300

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          Total loses were 1300, british were around 750

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            If you're implying 500+ Natal conscripts were killed you're an idiot. They would break and ran at the first sign of trouble and the Zulu were taught to not even bother killing them unless they had too (they were taught specifically to go for White redcoat infantry).

            >Also I would like the point out again the Anglo casus belli for the whole 1979 conflict is 100% made up bullshit.
            I'm honestly surprised to hear that a casus belli was even provided at all

            Hah, true. One thing that made Isandhlwana so bad was it prevented Chelmsford the quick resolution to the "war" since they generally started it without explicit approval from London, because London was going through economic woes and didn't need some foreign bullshit clogging things up. But it was too big of an incident to ignore.

            https://i.imgur.com/KGTxIWe.jpg

            A couple of questions about Isandlwana since you seem like an expert on this subject.

            1. If Chelmsford had immediately reacted to reports that his base camp was under attack, was there any possibility of rescuing them or was there no way of reaching it in time?

            2. If the Zulu had opted to engage Chelmsford's column instead, would they have fared any better or the battle have been a complete massacre for the British all the same?

            3. Was there anything Pulleine and Durnford could have done differently once they were under attack? Could they have had their men abandon the camp, climb onto the nearby hill and fortify it? Should they have abandoned their equipment and conducted a fighting withdrawal back to Natal (obviously a disorganized retreat would have just led to an accelerated version of the same outcome as staying and fighting, so a fighting withdrawal would have been their only chance of survival)?

            I realize that we're speaking from the benefit of a century's worth of hindsight and there was obviously no way they were going to abandon all of those provisions and equipment to the enemy because they would have faced a certain court-martial for cowardice. But say you gave them a crystal ball ten minutes before the Zulu are spotted and they both decided that saving their men was more important than saving their equipment or their careers, what could they have done?

            [...]

            IIRC all of the buildings except the church had thatched roofs, so a fire would have rapidly consumed them along anyone inside. The hospital actually was set ablaze during the night and roughly 1/3rd of the fatalities resulted from that one incident.

            https://i.imgur.com/EZuvyur.jpg

            Good questions!
            1) I think he was too far away at the time to have helped but they could've fricked up the disorganized Zulu after the battle had they got there by late afternoon. Cavalry only could've got there in time but not sure it would've been enough without the cannon and foot.
            2) Could have gone either way still but British would have advantage, Chelmsford was looking for a quick decisive battle and ready to fight, had reliable troops and would've been ready to deploy them for proper Civilizing of native folk.
            3) Pulleine was hamstrung by his orders and Durnford didn't realize they faced the main Zulu force until it was too late (he thought it was a Zulu flanking force to hit Chelmsford from behind). If they knew the threat immediately from the midmorning reports they could've put screens farther out and set up better fallback lines at the camp perimeter, which may have allowed them to hold out for Dartnell and Chelmsford cavalry support. But hindsight is 20/20.

            Oh yeah to elaborate on #2, for example later in January Pearson's column got legitimately ambushed, while they weren't as outnumbered as Chelmsford would've been, they deployed aggressively in skirmish and fricked up the Zulu at Inyezane.

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              What made the Natal Native Contingent so skittish about engaging the Zulu anyway? My understanding was that most of them were recruited from tribes that were sworn enemies of and had been previously oppressed by the Zulu. If anything, they should have been more enthusiastic about it than the British even.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                They were just mercenaries and in it for an easy paycheck. Plus, they were scared big time. There's a corollary in our day and age; the Saudis have been conductive warfare in Yemen mainly with African hirelings. It hasn't gone so well there either.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      >the power of defensive fortifications

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      It was a good showing on both sides.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        Yeah it's funny Isandhlwana is a textbook mishandling of picketing and reconnaisance of the enemy, camp and supply train mismanagement, and deployment (especially retreat/fallback) mistakes, but Rorke's Drift is almost textbook study of improvised defense and local management against a superior enemy attack in short notice.

        And not that a court politician of a tiny fuedal state like Zululand compares to a military/political career in the British Empire, but it's also funny that while Isandhlwana essentially ended Lord Chelmsford's career, Prince Dabulamanzi's career and reputation was over because of the debacle at Rorke's Drift.

  9. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Don't forget those same zulus routed a British column then ran 20 miles the next morning to storm the defenses

    They seriously overstretched themselves

  10. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Tactics and weaponds; as it always has been

  11. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    Race

  12. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    I saw a documentary that said the reason they were overrun was because they couldn't open the metal tabs on the ammo crates fast enough. I think the proof they had was from an excavation

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      Wasnt this the battle were the ammo crates were screwed shut and they had like 2 screwdrivers? Also the bongs sop called for one crate to be opened at a time instead of popping em all and passing it around

      The inability to open ammo boxes reason was proven to be bullshit, the crates were flimsy and would just have smashed open with rifle butts or on the ground if they had not enough screwdrivers.

      The overextended British lines and inability to hand out the ammo fast enough was the reason

  13. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    People also disregard that the Zulu force at Rorke's Drift were split between two political rivals; Kemapitha and Prince Dambulazambi. King Cetschwayo also had very specific orders that there would be no attacks into Natal, which the Prince ignored because he was mad he missed the big battle at Islandhwana since their forces were to screen the border in case another British column was in reserve. So half of the Zulu forces weren't going to get involved and a chunk of the other half were mustered piecemeal in response to the failed initial raid which started from dubious motives.

    Not undermining the danger the mission or the British garrison was in, nor their bravery and tenacity, but the idea of brave civilized men triumphant against the endless hordes of savages is romanticised nonsense.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      was it like how the IJN attacked the US because they were bored lol?

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        The Americans were being aggressive and wanted to deprive Japan of oil.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          And why did they want to disrupt the supply of oil to Japan? They weren't raping their way through Asia, were they?

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            Japan was only restoring order and protecting their national interests. Instability in China was (and still is) a problem for the whole region.

            • 1 month ago
              Anonymous

              Except the part the Embargo of oil only happened because the Japanese attacked European colonies which the US specifically said not to do.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                Japan only attacked attacked the British and Dutch possessions after they declared war on America. The only colonial power they attacked beforehand was Vichy France.
                And it really wasn't America's business.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                >And it really wasn't America's business.
                moron
                >hey don't hurt my friends or we will have problems
                Is this concept seriously so hard to imagine for the asiatics?

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                nips

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                America was friends with Vichy France?

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                Irrelevant. The caveat was "DO NOT INVADE INDOCHINA OR OTHER EUROPEAN COLONIES" PERIOD. Break this you get sanctioned. What did Japan do? Invade Indochina and then European colonies. If they didn't want to be sanctioned they shouldn't have invaded.

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                It wasn't Japan's business to invade Indo-China

              • 1 month ago
                Anonymous

                >And it really wasn't America's business.
                The funny thing about international politics is that if a sovereign government says something is their business, then it is their business.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        To be fair to the negationist, they didn't attack because they were bored. They attacked because they'd never be able to capture the Bob Semple design docs with the US/UK around to protect them.

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        No, not even close and I don't understand what you're even implying with that. The Zulu attack on Rorke's Drift was not some big planned event and half the the Zulu forces there didn't commit to any attack for political reasons: one, to not defy the King's orders in not attacking outside Zululand, and two, to stick it to Debulamanzi, who was a court rival to the other Zulu commander of those forces, Kemapitha. Debulamanzi fricked up by crossing the river and moving up (looking for stragglers from Isandhlwana since their force was in reserve and didn't get to play a part in the battle and was hopped up by the rush of the victory). They moved upstream on the Natal side around Oskarberg and hit the mission before running into any of the British stragglers. Again half the force wasn't liking defying the king and and wouldn't commit to any attack, and the half that did piecemeal after a testing raid went south and the had to commit to try to save their forces pinned down.

        Not undermining the effective tactics, planning, and bravery of the garrison at Rorke's Drift, nor the danger they were in, but the amount of Zulu "assaulting" the mission is exaggerated.

        Like everything in war, logistics made all the difference. The Zulu regiments were second and third line troops (older men between 30 and 50) that had been out of supplies for a day before the battle. They fought for a while, took a bunch of casualties, and then left because they were hungry.

        This is mostly bullshit. They were the "loins" quarter of the army, so regiments for reserve (which is why their task was to screen the border for British supporting units after Isandhlwana), but they weren't second line troops as by 1879 the kraal regiments would consist of multiple age group brigades. They also didn't have the bloated supply needs of the British, and could mostly live off the land; which was one strategic weakness of Cetshawayo's plan to only operate within his own borders to not appear belligerant to Europeans, was it would put more strain on his own realm. Although as of the late 1870s Zululand was veritably rich compared to British Natal or Transvaal.

        Also I would like the point out again the Anglo casus belli for the whole 1979 conflict is 100% made up bullshit.

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          >1979 conflict
          1879 obviously.
          Heh 1979 conflict is closer to the end scene of Lethal Weapon 2 than Zulu.
          >just been revoked

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          >Also I would like the point out again the Anglo casus belli for the whole 1979 conflict is 100% made up bullshit.
          I'm honestly surprised to hear that a casus belli was even provided at all

        • 1 month ago
          Anonymous

          A couple of questions about Isandlwana since you seem like an expert on this subject.

          1. If Chelmsford had immediately reacted to reports that his base camp was under attack, was there any possibility of rescuing them or was there no way of reaching it in time?

          2. If the Zulu had opted to engage Chelmsford's column instead, would they have fared any better or the battle have been a complete massacre for the British all the same?

          3. Was there anything Pulleine and Durnford could have done differently once they were under attack? Could they have had their men abandon the camp, climb onto the nearby hill and fortify it? Should they have abandoned their equipment and conducted a fighting withdrawal back to Natal (obviously a disorganized retreat would have just led to an accelerated version of the same outcome as staying and fighting, so a fighting withdrawal would have been their only chance of survival)?

          I realize that we're speaking from the benefit of a century's worth of hindsight and there was obviously no way they were going to abandon all of those provisions and equipment to the enemy because they would have faced a certain court-martial for cowardice. But say you gave them a crystal ball ten minutes before the Zulu are spotted and they both decided that saving their men was more important than saving their equipment or their careers, what could they have done?

          the building on fire was bad?

          IIRC all of the buildings except the church had thatched roofs, so a fire would have rapidly consumed them along anyone inside. The hospital actually was set ablaze during the night and roughly 1/3rd of the fatalities resulted from that one incident.

          • 1 month ago
            Anonymous

            Good questions!
            1) I think he was too far away at the time to have helped but they could've fricked up the disorganized Zulu after the battle had they got there by late afternoon. Cavalry only could've got there in time but not sure it would've been enough without the cannon and foot.
            2) Could have gone either way still but British would have advantage, Chelmsford was looking for a quick decisive battle and ready to fight, had reliable troops and would've been ready to deploy them for proper Civilizing of native folk.
            3) Pulleine was hamstrung by his orders and Durnford didn't realize they faced the main Zulu force until it was too late (he thought it was a Zulu flanking force to hit Chelmsford from behind). If they knew the threat immediately from the midmorning reports they could've put screens farther out and set up better fallback lines at the camp perimeter, which may have allowed them to hold out for Dartnell and Chelmsford cavalry support. But hindsight is 20/20.

  14. 2 months ago
    Anonymous

    [...]

    >Didn't prepare defenses properly, weren't vigilant enough because of overconfidence
    >Caught completely by surprise
    >Ammo boxes[...]
    >Solar eclipse gave cover to close distance during attack

    eclipse gave cover to close distance during attack
    lol what. An annular solar eclipse doesn't get dark, it's a level of illumination similar to the morning when the sun is still near the horizon. It mainly just gets colder. Even a total solar eclipse doesn't get dark light nighttime, it gets dark like twilight (for a couple minutes).

    • 2 months ago
      Anonymous

      That's not what soldiers accounts say

      >“The sun turned black in the middle of the battle, we could still see it over us, or we should have thought we had been fighting till evening. Then we got into the camp, and there was a great deal of smoke and firing. Afterwards the sun came out bright again.”
      >Man of the uNokhenke.

      https://adventuresinhistoryland.com/2016/05/30/isandlwana-the-zulu-victory-part-4/#more-1767

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        >t. some uneducated black African tribesman, translated into English
        It doesn't get very dark, anon. The light gets a bit dimmer and it feels like morning or evening, but it's not dark. Nobody could sneak up on you during an eclipse of any kind, because during the partial/annular it's not dark enough to sneak up on anything, and a total eclipse (which still doesn't really get dark enough to sneak up on anybody) only lasts a few minutes.
        If you've never seen an eclipse this may be difficult to understand. Sorry.

  15. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Like everything in war, logistics made all the difference. The Zulu regiments were second and third line troops (older men between 30 and 50) that had been out of supplies for a day before the battle. They fought for a while, took a bunch of casualties, and then left because they were hungry.

  16. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    All tactics, the battle of Rorke's drift only happened because of the crushing defeat at Islandwana
    Same force, same gear, same training - but Rorke's drift was a prepared position whereas Islandwana was a textbook ambush
    If Islandwana is a perfect example of good tactics overcoming a significant technological disadvantage, then Rorke's drift is a similarly perfect example of advanced technology overcoming a significant tactical disadvantage

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      Isandhlwana wasn't an ambush at all as Chelmsford first reached there with Col. Glyn's 3rd Column on January 20th and spent a day and a half trying to unfrick his baggage train and not fortify the camp for some reason. Evening of the 21st Major Dartnell, commanding most of the cavalry of 3rd column, engaged with a reportedly "significant Zulu force" a few miles southeast of camp, and reported he was holding position and not pressing due to the enemy force.

      Before dawn on the 22nd, Chelmsford and Glyn set out southeast from Isandhlwana camp with 6 infantry companies, most of the artillery, and the rest of the cavalry. He sent a dispatch to Col. Durnford, commanding the 2nd Column, to bring himself and his cavalry to Isandhlwana and take command, and gave orders to LtCol Pulliene to keep infantry outposts near camp and only fight defensively. So the morning of the 22d the idea was the Zulu army was 10-15 miles east-southeast of camp, not 4-8 miles northwest of camp where it actually was.

  17. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Tactics. The territory and stupid fricking decisions (splitting the force, minimum combat load) as Isandlwana combined with Zulu numbers and aggression doomed the British, while Rouke's Drift was the opposite. The Zulu made a critical error by not using their numbers and setting a building on fire.

    • 1 month ago
      Anonymous

      the building on fire was bad?

      • 1 month ago
        Anonymous

        https://i.imgur.com/KGTxIWe.jpg

        A couple of questions about Isandlwana since you seem like an expert on this subject.

        1. If Chelmsford had immediately reacted to reports that his base camp was under attack, was there any possibility of rescuing them or was there no way of reaching it in time?

        2. If the Zulu had opted to engage Chelmsford's column instead, would they have fared any better or the battle have been a complete massacre for the British all the same?

        3. Was there anything Pulleine and Durnford could have done differently once they were under attack? Could they have had their men abandon the camp, climb onto the nearby hill and fortify it? Should they have abandoned their equipment and conducted a fighting withdrawal back to Natal (obviously a disorganized retreat would have just led to an accelerated version of the same outcome as staying and fighting, so a fighting withdrawal would have been their only chance of survival)?

        I realize that we're speaking from the benefit of a century's worth of hindsight and there was obviously no way they were going to abandon all of those provisions and equipment to the enemy because they would have faced a certain court-martial for cowardice. But say you gave them a crystal ball ten minutes before the Zulu are spotted and they both decided that saving their men was more important than saving their equipment or their careers, what could they have done?

        [...]

        IIRC all of the buildings except the church had thatched roofs, so a fire would have rapidly consumed them along anyone inside. The hospital actually was set ablaze during the night and roughly 1/3rd of the fatalities resulted from that one incident.

        >building fire
        It actually illuminated the area, preventing the Zulu from creeping up on the British and allowing them to survive the night.

  18. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Bleh shitty ass phone camera pics shouldn't have bothered and just waited to get on my PC and post Bud Bradshaw paintings instead (although I only have two).

  19. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    What blew up this time vatnik? Kremlin propaganda is wat makes you look down on the noble Zulus.

  20. 1 month ago
    Anonymous

    Discipline and training in musketry. Not sure if that counts as tactics.

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