Market Garden succeeds

Let's say II SS Panzer Corps is completely withdrawn back to Germany the day before start of the operation and unable to be sent back in time to affect the outcome. Let's say 1st Allied Airborne Army isn't run by complete fricking morons and they copy the Operation Pegasus model of having advance units seize all key objectives before they could be destroyed or reinforced (Urquhart was the only one who actually tried to do this and even then they had to march nearly 10 miles from their LZ and were only able to take the Arnhem bridge intact due to German incompetence), preventing the fatal delays at Son and Nijmegen. Let's say James Gavin is so infuriated at Horrocks' dithering after capturing Nijmegen bridge that he has a regiment of the 82nd Airborne march through the night to Arnhem to relieve Colonel Frost themselves. Let's say 1st Airborne's radios actually fricking work. It doesn't matter. Market Garden succeeds and the Western Allies now have a crossing over the Rhine River in late-September, 1944.

What happens then? Would the Allies be able capitalize on that and launch an attack on the Ruhr? Would taking the Ruhr in October or November really cause a total German collapse? Would the war have really ended by Christmas? Or was the whole prospect a fantasy on par with "Three Day Special Military Operation" and success at Arnhem would have simply resulted in an even worse failure further up the road?

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  1. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    ummm i think germany was fricked ever since we started bombing their ball bearing factory

  2. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    in the unlikely event that market garden succeeds, the allies win in half the time because they get their belgian ports earlier and can sustain a major push

    ardennes offensive never happens because now they have to focus all their reserves against the renewed allied offensive and have even less to waste

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      Wrong. All channel ports were garrisoned and the allies had to fight for the ones they took.

      It would possibly have cleared Antwerp for usage a few months sooner, and Antwerp was *the* logistics hub the Allies had been needing the whole campaign.

      Honestly, the better alt-scenario is the US getting Gold/Juno/Sword, running a couple Armored Divisions into the German Panzers covering Caen, and then breaking out on a single axis straight into the Low Countries a couple months earlier than in reality.

      It was Eisenhower who explicitly forbade an advance on a narrow axis and instead ordered an advance on a broad front. The Brits were champing at the bit to have 30 corps let off the leash and rush B straight into the Low Countries but the Americans wouldn’t allow it.

      • 11 months ago
        Anonymous

        >let off the leash and rush
        Like a mad rabbit

      • 11 months ago
        Anonymous

        >It was Eisenhower who explicitly forbade an advance on a narrow axis
        That's because the "narrow axis" would have been the coastal route, i.e., the Brits, who were running on fumes in terms of logistics and manpower reserves. It's unlikely that they would have succeeded on their own, as evidenced by the long slog at Caen.

        The US Army had one serious advantage over the Brits by 1944: it was much fresher, with dozens of new divisions to throw into combat. It had a larger manpower pool to draw replacements from, a better combined-arms force in its Armored Divisions, and a larger logistics system. It might have been able to make that same push into the Low Countries, but British diplomats had forced their own troops into the eastern invasion beaches (and thus, the coastal route eastward) because they wanted to guarantee that once the war was won, they'd occupy the northernmost sector of Germany. Why? Well, if the occupation were to fall apart, and they needed to abandon it, that would put their troops right next to their friends in the Low Countries, so they'd have an easy way out. The US would get stuck with the southernmost sector (and France, which Eisenhower dodged by letting De Gaulle deal with that mess).

        It made no military sense; not for the Allies as a whole, and not even for the British Army (See: Goodwood, et al). But that was what the bureaucrats wanted, and that's what they got.

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          >It's unlikely that they would have succeeded on their own, as evidenced by the long slog at Caen.

          Victim of American education detected

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          >The US Army had one serious advantage over the Brits by 1944: it was much fresher, with dozens of new divisions to throw into combat. It had a larger manpower pool to draw replacements from, a better combined-arms force in its Armored Divisions, and a larger logistics system

          Also all of this is spectacularly wrong with no basis in history or fact.

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          In Northwest Europe, the US troops had horrible logistics and were 100 % dependent on the British from June to September 1944. The US Army in Europe didn’t get its logistics in order until March 1945 due to a combination of various factors. The first is that the US Officer Corps was below average, so your planning and logistical staffs didn’t consist of the best and the brightest.

          The second was a chronic lack of intelligence. Without hard figures, the US had to make assumptions and most of these were wrong. here are some faulty assumptions:

          >Fuel consumption was calculated based on flat well-paved roads. Fuel consumption on Pacific Islands, the North African desert, and non-paved roads was obviously mush higher, not to mention cross-country consumption and mountainous areas.
          >The average bridge in Europe could only handle 3 tonnes. So most US trucks could not be used in areas with such bridges.
          >The assumption was that the railroads in France would be 100% intact. In and by itself already ridiculous as the Allies themselves bombed them in advance of the Normandy Landings to prevent the Germans from moving troops and supplies. In reality, only 10% was available.
          >It was assumed all canals and rivers could be used. In reality, these were blocked on average every 10 kilometres in France and Belgium.
          >It was assumed most major ports would fall into Allied hands intact, in reality, if the Germans couldn’t hold a port, they would thoroughly destroy it.

          So the lack of rail and riverine transport meant more trucks were needed which meant much more fuel would be needed. That meant tankers needed to be able to unload in French ports which was not possible as these were either still in German hands or destroyed. The British had provided pipelines of fuel under the Channel and could use coastal vessels and smaller ports, the large American ocean-going vessels couldn’t use these large ports.

          • 11 months ago
            Anonymous

            >The first is that the US Officer Corps was below average, so your planning and logistical staffs didn’t consist of the best and the brightest.
            >The second was a chronic lack of intelligence. Without hard figures, the US had to make assumptions and most of these were wrong. here are some faulty assumptions:
            >Fuel consumption was calculated based on flat well-paved roads. Fuel consumption on Pacific Islands, the North African desert, and non-paved roads was obviously mush higher, not to mention cross-country consumption and mountainous areas.
            >The average bridge in Europe could only handle 3 tonnes. So most US trucks could not be used in areas with such bridges.
            >The assumption was that the railroads in France would be 100% intact. In and by itself already ridiculous as the Allies themselves bombed them in advance of the Normandy Landings to prevent the Germans from moving troops and supplies. In reality, only 10% was available.
            >It was assumed all canals and rivers could be used. In reality, these were blocked on average every 10 kilometres in France and Belgium.
            >It was assumed most major ports would fall into Allied hands intact, in reality, if the Germans couldn’t hold a port, they would thoroughly destroy it.

            Hey wait a sec, this all sounds familiar...

          • 11 months ago
            Anonymous

            >the US troops had horrible logistics and were 100 % dependent on the British from June to September 1944
            who could be behind this post?

            • 11 months ago
              Anonymous

              Literally anyone with access to the internet or an education, you think Brits are on PrepHole at 5am UK time?

              • 11 months ago
                Anonymous

                >t. bong

              • 11 months ago
                Anonymous

                Don't get upset because you can't prove your dumb claims

              • 11 months ago
                Anonymous

                >posted by someone with bad teeth

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          >it was much fresher

          Wouldn't having inexperienced men be a bad thing?

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      >What happens then
      Ruhr Pocket

      >ardennes offensive never happens
      Or happens in autumn 1944 instead of winter, is slaughtered even more hilariously with clear skies overhead

      Succeeds at what? It's objectives were moronic, and its implementation even more so. The logic was:
      >if only we can cross the Rhine, we can rush our way into Germany because their army was broken on the western front
      >btw the British are still in this war, trust me, our manpower isn't depleted and our tech isn't outdated
      And they were wrong on both counts. Montgomery was an idiot and ruined not only the British Empire but also the Netherlands. A lot of people say the Seuz Crisis was when the British lost all political relevance, but the reality it was Market Garden. The Americans should have been the ones to drop into Arnhem and the British should have been responsible for linking up the bridges. Instead it was entirely ass backwards, and the British ran into German tanks they couldn't possibly hope to deal with.

      Seething

      >let off the leash and rush
      Like a mad rabbit

      Yanks wanted the prestige. In Southern Italy they criticised the British for not making lightning thrusts of this kind to pocket enemy armies, then conspicuously shut up when Mark Fricking Clark decided to take Rome instead of doing the same. And continued to stay mum when the same strategy didn't suit their image of rolling across Europe being feted as glorious saviours.

      • 11 months ago
        Anonymous

        You forget Hürtgen forest. The meatgrinder to Aachen and whatever the frick Omar Bradley was doing in this dumb forest, led directly to the bulge. Hitler unironically thought the yanks were beaten after that battle.
        I have plenty of family who served for the germs in that damn forest and while it was no fun for the wehrmacht, the americans had it worse. Nearly one vietnam in terms of casualties over a short amount of time. Tidbits I was told by the oldtimers at family gatherings.
        >yanks who usually knew where the frick they are in france were lost as frick in hürtgen. One defensive positions beat off so many attacks of lost GIs, they just waved them back to their lines after a night. The amercians complied without a fight and most of time traded gum/cigarettes for home made booze.
        >tanks driving through the shrubbery and just burning/shooting a path through the forest. All got stuck after some point.
        >one tank managed to get flipped on ot's head and was nicknamed "Saltokocher" by the germans. Translates zo "backflipcooker".
        >one Volksgrenadier troop was caught and had no ammo, so the old Feldwebel ordered them to die while yelling "Peng!". The yanks were confused what the frick they are doing until one guy who understood german went forward and said "Verhaftung!" and arrested the germans.
        >one mine killed a bear who had mauled and killed several yanks and germans one night, nobody knew how many exactly.
        >A 15 year old Volksgrenadier kid that somehow collected 20 american dog tags but wouldn't tell anyone how he got them. He was hosed down by a combar patrof very tired and angry yanks.

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          You should write down/put in print those recollections, lad.

        • 11 months ago
          Anonymous

          >Hürtgen forest
          Won't happen because they don't have to force the Siegfried Line, if Market Garden succeeds

  3. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    It would possibly have cleared Antwerp for usage a few months sooner, and Antwerp was *the* logistics hub the Allies had been needing the whole campaign.

    Honestly, the better alt-scenario is the US getting Gold/Juno/Sword, running a couple Armored Divisions into the German Panzers covering Caen, and then breaking out on a single axis straight into the Low Countries a couple months earlier than in reality.

  4. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    It was based on a wildly unrealistic appraisal of German strength so no, even if Arnhem Bridge had been taken intact, moving out of the Netherlands and into Germany would have been a different story all on its own.

  5. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    Succeeds at what? It's objectives were moronic, and its implementation even more so. The logic was:
    >if only we can cross the Rhine, we can rush our way into Germany because their army was broken on the western front
    >btw the British are still in this war, trust me, our manpower isn't depleted and our tech isn't outdated
    And they were wrong on both counts. Montgomery was an idiot and ruined not only the British Empire but also the Netherlands. A lot of people say the Seuz Crisis was when the British lost all political relevance, but the reality it was Market Garden. The Americans should have been the ones to drop into Arnhem and the British should have been responsible for linking up the bridges. Instead it was entirely ass backwards, and the British ran into German tanks they couldn't possibly hope to deal with.

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      >the British ran into German tanks they couldn't possibly hope to deal with.
      how would american paratroops been able to deal with them?

      • 11 months ago
        Anonymous

        With good ol' American grit. Yee-haw, ya bri'ish nancy boy.

      • 11 months ago
        Anonymous

        With something better than fricking spring mortars.

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      >A lot of people say the Seuz Crisis was when the British lost all political relevance, but the reality it was Market Garden.
      Fun fact, the US military was treated as the "Junior" partner to the British all the way up to the failure of Market Garden, despite the US military being far larger and providing all the supplies for the British. Reading about British hubris during WW2 can really make you start whispering perfidious albion under your breath.

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      >The Americans should have been the ones to drop into Arnhem and the British should have been responsible for linking up the bridges.

      I've always wondered how things would have gone if it had been the 101st Airborne jumping into Arnhem instead. Would it be A Bridge Too Far but with Captain Winters and Easy Company being massacred trying to hold the bridge instead of John Frost and 2 PARA, or would the Americans have been able to force a more positive outcome?

      For his part, Winters definitely does not seem like the kind of officer who would surrender a prize like Arnhem bridge so long as he still have even one man who was willing to defend it. He had after all wiped out the German garrison at Brecourt Manor with barely a squad's worth of men, an assault that was originally supposed to be made by the entire company.

  6. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    The best result would be delay d-day a year, let's soviet attack first so they have to fight full Germany.
    Once all German units bogged down in east then d-day, amphibious invasion facing full strength Germany while Soviets walk into the abandoned German posistions is the worst outcome for everyone, except the frenchies who previously surrendered get their country liberated for free. No such luck for everyone USSR replaced Nazis as occupiers

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      the date of D-day was necessary because stalin was begging for a second front, the italian front only diverted about a half-million german troops

      strategically, it made sense to coordinate a landing in normandy in summer of 1944 to coincide with operation bagration
      this meant that the germans would be caught between hammer and anvil, because the opening of a new front would coincide with the largest soviet offensive splitting german forces at the best possible time
      this would minimize total allied casualties compared to trying to launch them independently of each other

  7. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    I will no longer mindless parrot Hollywood history.

    • 11 months ago
      Anonymous

      What made the brits strong were heavy precision artillery from FOB observation officers along with with mobile artillery units to win counter battery engagements. Combined with a strong 17 pounder AT gun they could win by creep.

  8. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    What about Patton and the 3rd Army punching through the Siegfried Line and racing into Southern Germany, was that any more feasible than Market Garden or would the outcome have been a similarly spectacular failure?

  9. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    A better question is what happens if Eisenhower puts Montgomery in his place and refuses to provide the resources for Market Garden, instead opting to continue the "broad front" strategy they employed through France.

  10. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    >What happens then?

    Not that much. A bridgehead over Ijsser would probably be established but with german resistance solidyfing, autumn weather and logistical difficulties that would be it and 21 army group would have its hands full with Anwerp and rest of Netherlands on their left flank.

    This arguably speeds up the later offensive by ~2 months since Veritable and Grenade are sort of unnecessary but who knows how Eisen-attackeverywhere-hower would use it and how Germans would react immediately and in the longer term.

  11. 11 months ago
    Anonymous

    british would have a chance at actually capturing berlin ahead of soviets. it doesn't really change the war ending. hitler still kills himself, iron curtain still forms.

    the only real thing that would change late 1944-1945 is if western allies somehow secure germany all the way to polish border, and were able to help liberate warsaw with the armia krajowa and reinstall exiled government. british insistence on strong and independent poland would clash against soviet insistence on polish satellite state. a partioned east/west poland would be far more volatile than partioned germany.

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