BTGs are/were a vehicle heavy formation for a military that struggled to recruit contract soldiers. Right now, the vehicle advantage is gone and they have plenty of mobiks instead
Wrong; that is one Western interpretation of a 21st century Russian BTG
Not the same as what a Soviet BTG is
BTGs have been retired as a force org for nearly a year now
they were simply too small, a third the size of a US brigade combat team, which meant very little staying power in the field
>which meant very little staying power in the field
Actually has nothing to do with inherent size
It's like saying US BCTs have very little staying power compared to US Divisions
I read somewhere that they’ve abandoned the BTG. I think the original concept for the BTG was to focus on maneuver units with organic combined-arms. The problem was the RuAF was unable to adequately supply them for actual maneuver warfare resulting in the doctrine to fall apart. And comms earlier on was a clusterfuck.
This
The whole idea behind the BTG was that it's a brigade deploying its firepower with limited mechanized infantry presence. This was supposed to allow for rapid deployment, preferably with some local meatshield troops to act as the missing infantry (basically "the rebels" in this case). Deploying a BTG cannibalizes the brigade, which is why all those BTGs getting deleted left and right throughout 2022 was so funny.
A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions.
>A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions
Wrong
>Actually has nothing to do with inherent size
the same damage that would render a battalion combat ineffective wouldnt do the same to a brigade
bigger units can simply take more damage
>It's like saying US BCTs have very little staying power compared to US Divisions
they dont
the US is re-organizing to division-centric formations in preparation for a possible conventional war
the BCT was the center of the GWOT because they are never going to take enough losses in a single day to render them combat ineffective
but they would have been way too small to withstand damage against a symmetrical threat
it simply demonstrates that larger formations are more desirable for conventional war
divisions were the main strategic unit of maneuver, the downgrade to brigades was to reduce the economic strain of moving 10,000 people to fight an enemy with no mechanized forces
but they went back to divisions the moment it looked like they would fight an enemy with actual weapons
the US would use army-sized elements if for some reason WW3 took up more geographic space and used up more men than WW2, but thankfully it has never come to that
>the downgrade to brigades was to reduce the economic strain
no
Russian BTGs min-maxed equipment over infantry. In a normal BTG, you'd have one company of infantry to two reinforced companies of equipment. It's an anemic force structure and it died for this reason. Dudes with shotguns and their street clothes managed a lot during the early phase due to a lack of infantry protection in the field.
kind of, yes
the Russians believed that if 1 infantry battalion plus tanks and artillery can do this, then surely 1 infantry battalion plus tanks and LOTS OF ARTILLERY can be much better
didn't work
BTGs were created under the assumption that Russia wouldn't fight attrition wars anymore. They were trying to copy the NATO style of rapid offensives.
However, one of their biggest failings was that even though BTGs in concept were supposed to be a sign of Russia's transition to a smaller but more elite professional military, they were still heavily reliant on conscripts to actually fully man them. Pretty much all of the BTGs sent into Ukraine were dangerously undermanned and they just got annihilated by roadside ambushes.
You must separate the issue of manning from the issue of combat organisation
Here's a question: Would the 21st century Russian BTG be successful if it was fully manned by professional troops?
The whole idea behind the BTG was that it's a brigade deploying its firepower with limited mechanized infantry presence. This was supposed to allow for rapid deployment, preferably with some local meatshield troops to act as the missing infantry (basically "the rebels" in this case). Deploying a BTG cannibalizes the brigade, which is why all those BTGs getting deleted left and right throughout 2022 was so funny.
A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions.
The Warsaw Pact didn't operate brigades outside of specialized units, and the Soviet experimental development of the OMG didn't occur until the final years of the cold war. So yes, those contained brigades would have used BTGs.
But the standard Soviet formation was the Division made up of Regiments, which consisted entirely of organic battalions which could (almost always would) then be task organised or beefed up to become reinforced battalions for specialized missions, such as the advance guard.
Russian BTGs min-maxed equipment over infantry. In a normal BTG, you'd have one company of infantry to two reinforced companies of equipment. It's an anemic force structure and it died for this reason. Dudes with shotguns and their street clothes managed a lot during the early phase due to a lack of infantry protection in the field.
It's a demonstration of why every able bodied male should own what ever arms, armor and equipment they have available to them. This cunt went out to fight ruskies with a fucking O/U shotgun.
BTGs were created under the assumption that Russia wouldn't fight attrition wars anymore. They were trying to copy the NATO style of rapid offensives.
However, one of their biggest failings was that even though BTGs in concept were supposed to be a sign of Russia's transition to a smaller but more elite professional military, they were still heavily reliant on conscripts to actually fully man them. Pretty much all of the BTGs sent into Ukraine were dangerously undermanned and they just got annihilated by roadside ambushes.
BTGs have been retired as a force org for nearly a year now
they were simply too small, a third the size of a US brigade combat team, which meant very little staying power in the field
Comparing BTG to brigade, seriously? What next gonna compare brigade to division? You know that ex Warsaw Pact or today's russian brigade are 3 BTG right?
>You know that ex Warsaw Pact or today's russian brigade are 3 BTG right?
Not the case for the Russian army, buddy
Russian formations before the war concentrated limited professional soldiers into BTGs. Separate brigades could form 1-2 BTGs at most, and they acted as the basic unit of manoeuvre for the Russian army, which makes them analogous to the BCT. This was a fundamental reason for Russia's failure at the start of the war, too many separate uncoordinated units
Wow its almost like russia is a Spain-tier economy somehow maintaining le ebin huge military. Surely corners weren't being cut to give the impression of strength
The whole idea behind the BTG was that it's a brigade deploying its firepower with limited mechanized infantry presence. This was supposed to allow for rapid deployment, preferably with some local meatshield troops to act as the missing infantry (basically "the rebels" in this case). Deploying a BTG cannibalizes the brigade, which is why all those BTGs getting deleted left and right throughout 2022 was so funny.
A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions.
Each Russian brigade was supposed to be able to deploy two BTGs while the last third were garrisoned for training/conscription, so 1 BTG is equivalent to 0.5 NATO brigades.
It's a valid comparison because BTGs were deployed in the same way as BCTs. The issue is BTGs were quickly chewed to bits, and consolidating them was difficult because you suddenly had to unify two combat commands.
I read somewhere that they’ve abandoned the BTG. I think the original concept for the BTG was to focus on maneuver units with organic combined-arms. The problem was the RuAF was unable to adequately supply them for actual maneuver warfare resulting in the doctrine to fall apart. And comms earlier on was a clusterfuck.
Comms would be the big killer. An army consisting of multiple maneuverable self-contained units requires a high degree of coordination in order to shape the battlefield and exploit successes. Instead the Russians are simply too stupid, and the Ukies read their comms like an open book, so individual BTGs simply kept wandering into ambushes, cut off, then destroyed by accurate artillery fire.
> very undermanned.
reminder that this was a problem because (1) they didn't include armored vehicle screening training in conscript boot camp, not that conscripts would ever voluntarily venture in FRONT of a tank to protect it, and (2) Putin decided it "wasn't a war" and refused to fill the boots with conscripts, as the cost-cutting doctrine mandated
Russia shit the bed at all levels
it failed spectacularly. russian hierarchy is far too top down for small independent units to take the initiative. they're also way too small so even minor casualties will render them combat ineffective very quickly.
The thing no one gets is that the Soviet-Russian top-down system was a product of necessity. Their army is made up predominantly of minority peasants who don’t have the IQ to handle a high degree of independence at anything above the lowest level. That’s also why they don’t have anything equal to the Anglo NCO system. Most people just say Russia is dumb for not organizing like a Western military — the reality is that they CAN’T.
Too focused on the utilization of reserve and indigenous paramilitary forces to support maneuvers and professional contract troops in logistical and garrison support. Worked great against the Ukranians up till 2022 and now there aren’t enough Lugandans or Donbabweans to support the contract troops who are all dead anyways.
like most special ideal plans it melted in the face of a peer war with formations being moved on the brigade or regiment level and ah-hoc assault groups being the only method of attacking
BTGs are/were a vehicle heavy formation for a military that struggled to recruit contract soldiers. Right now, the vehicle advantage is gone and they have plenty of mobiks instead
Wrong; that is one Western interpretation of a 21st century Russian BTG
Not the same as what a Soviet BTG is
>which meant very little staying power in the field
Actually has nothing to do with inherent size
It's like saying US BCTs have very little staying power compared to US Divisions
This
>A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions
Wrong
>Actually has nothing to do with inherent size
the same damage that would render a battalion combat ineffective wouldnt do the same to a brigade
bigger units can simply take more damage
>It's like saying US BCTs have very little staying power compared to US Divisions
they dont
the US is re-organizing to division-centric formations in preparation for a possible conventional war
the BCT was the center of the GWOT because they are never going to take enough losses in a single day to render them combat ineffective
but they would have been way too small to withstand damage against a symmetrical threat
By that logic, the US should reorganise to corps-centric formations, that will be even better, nicht wahr?
it simply demonstrates that larger formations are more desirable for conventional war
divisions were the main strategic unit of maneuver, the downgrade to brigades was to reduce the economic strain of moving 10,000 people to fight an enemy with no mechanized forces
but they went back to divisions the moment it looked like they would fight an enemy with actual weapons
the US would use army-sized elements if for some reason WW3 took up more geographic space and used up more men than WW2, but thankfully it has never come to that
>the downgrade to brigades was to reduce the economic strain
no
kind of, yes
the Russians believed that if 1 infantry battalion plus tanks and artillery can do this, then surely 1 infantry battalion plus tanks and LOTS OF ARTILLERY can be much better
didn't work
You must separate the issue of manning from the issue of combat organisation
Here's a question: Would the 21st century Russian BTG be successful if it was fully manned by professional troops?
The Warsaw Pact didn't operate brigades outside of specialized units, and the Soviet experimental development of the OMG didn't occur until the final years of the cold war. So yes, those contained brigades would have used BTGs.
But the standard Soviet formation was the Division made up of Regiments, which consisted entirely of organic battalions which could (almost always would) then be task organised or beefed up to become reinforced battalions for specialized missions, such as the advance guard.
>battalions which could (almost always would) then be task organised
and they called them, guess what? Battalion Tactical Groups
The source is Lester W. Grau's "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility" (1989).
Russian BTGs min-maxed equipment over infantry. In a normal BTG, you'd have one company of infantry to two reinforced companies of equipment. It's an anemic force structure and it died for this reason. Dudes with shotguns and their street clothes managed a lot during the early phase due to a lack of infantry protection in the field.
Early-war Ukrainians were still tough as fuck to DARE oppose what was supposed to crush Kyiv in 72 hours.
They called Moscow's bluff.
It's a demonstration of why every able bodied male should own what ever arms, armor and equipment they have available to them. This cunt went out to fight ruskies with a fucking O/U shotgun.
BTGs were created under the assumption that Russia wouldn't fight attrition wars anymore. They were trying to copy the NATO style of rapid offensives.
However, one of their biggest failings was that even though BTGs in concept were supposed to be a sign of Russia's transition to a smaller but more elite professional military, they were still heavily reliant on conscripts to actually fully man them. Pretty much all of the BTGs sent into Ukraine were dangerously undermanned and they just got annihilated by roadside ambushes.
War Crime! Both of them died with their hands up. Clearly tried to surrender.
BTGs have been retired as a force org for nearly a year now
they were simply too small, a third the size of a US brigade combat team, which meant very little staying power in the field
Comparing BTG to brigade, seriously? What next gonna compare brigade to division? You know that ex Warsaw Pact or today's russian brigade are 3 BTG right?
>You know that ex Warsaw Pact or today's russian brigade are 3 BTG right?
Not the case for the Russian army, buddy
Russian formations before the war concentrated limited professional soldiers into BTGs. Separate brigades could form 1-2 BTGs at most, and they acted as the basic unit of manoeuvre for the Russian army, which makes them analogous to the BCT. This was a fundamental reason for Russia's failure at the start of the war, too many separate uncoordinated units
>Comparing BTG to brigade, seriously?
Yes, seriously. Both were the basic operational maneuver unit in their respective armies.
Wow its almost like russia is a Spain-tier economy somehow maintaining le ebin huge military. Surely corners weren't being cut to give the impression of strength
The whole idea behind the BTG was that it's a brigade deploying its firepower with limited mechanized infantry presence. This was supposed to allow for rapid deployment, preferably with some local meatshield troops to act as the missing infantry (basically "the rebels" in this case). Deploying a BTG cannibalizes the brigade, which is why all those BTGs getting deleted left and right throughout 2022 was so funny.
A Warsaw Pact brigade didn't have any BTGs, it had organic battalions.
Each Russian brigade was supposed to be able to deploy two BTGs while the last third were garrisoned for training/conscription, so 1 BTG is equivalent to 0.5 NATO brigades.
It's a valid comparison because BTGs were deployed in the same way as BCTs. The issue is BTGs were quickly chewed to bits, and consolidating them was difficult because you suddenly had to unify two combat commands.
I read somewhere that they’ve abandoned the BTG. I think the original concept for the BTG was to focus on maneuver units with organic combined-arms. The problem was the RuAF was unable to adequately supply them for actual maneuver warfare resulting in the doctrine to fall apart. And comms earlier on was a clusterfuck.
Comms would be the big killer. An army consisting of multiple maneuverable self-contained units requires a high degree of coordination in order to shape the battlefield and exploit successes. Instead the Russians are simply too stupid, and the Ukies read their comms like an open book, so individual BTGs simply kept wandering into ambushes, cut off, then destroyed by accurate artillery fire.
they dont have enough machines left to fill the chart as described in your pic
>22 supply units
What were they thinking?
They were thinking the BTG was a guaranteed 1HKO.
thinking..?
One of the main problems the Russian BTGs had at the start of the was that they were very undermanned.
The BTGs were going in with all their vehicles, but maybe 2 dismounts per vehicle.
> very undermanned.
reminder that this was a problem because (1) they didn't include armored vehicle screening training in conscript boot camp, not that conscripts would ever voluntarily venture in FRONT of a tank to protect it, and (2) Putin decided it "wasn't a war" and refused to fill the boots with conscripts, as the cost-cutting doctrine mandated
Russia shit the bed at all levels
BEING THIS ISN'T ABOUT WEAPONS
IM GONNA SAY PASS AND HERBS
TO&E is literally weapons and equipment.
it failed spectacularly. russian hierarchy is far too top down for small independent units to take the initiative. they're also way too small so even minor casualties will render them combat ineffective very quickly.
The thing no one gets is that the Soviet-Russian top-down system was a product of necessity. Their army is made up predominantly of minority peasants who don’t have the IQ to handle a high degree of independence at anything above the lowest level. That’s also why they don’t have anything equal to the Anglo NCO system. Most people just say Russia is dumb for not organizing like a Western military — the reality is that they CAN’T.
Too focused on the utilization of reserve and indigenous paramilitary forces to support maneuvers and professional contract troops in logistical and garrison support. Worked great against the Ukranians up till 2022 and now there aren’t enough Lugandans or Donbabweans to support the contract troops who are all dead anyways.
like most special ideal plans it melted in the face of a peer war with formations being moved on the brigade or regiment level and ah-hoc assault groups being the only method of attacking
This is from the May 2023 RUSI report:
https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf